No subject was specified.

[a.s@clix.pt]

Is 
	there 
a distinct role for logic, 
and for a kind of scientific objectivity that would not be naive    ? 
How can conceptual systems function in relation to
			              more-than-conceptual intricacy? 
              In 
what 
sense do we move 
beyond the utterly different 
meanings that each culture 
gives even to the most universal 
words such as "body" and "person?" 

              Is there a path from Wittgenstein? 
He could let a word acquire many new meanings. Although one cannot
represent language, no concept or metaphysics
              controls new uses of words in situations. 

              Can we speak-from practice-and-theory and implicitly
intricate bodily experiencing? 

  Can we speak-from ourselves without
 subjectivity/objectivity? 
(Example: "If someone has a pain in the hand ... one does not comfort
the hand, 
	but the sufferer." Wittgenstein, P I 286) 
           
   Can a new phenomenology speak-from intricacy, rather than attempting
"description?" 

              Can we articulate the implicit political and ethical 
stand of using the critique of assumptions to free people, rather 
than to silence them?