[AGL] Jeff's missing article by William Lind

[Michael Eisenstadt]

The investigations of Marines for possible murders of Iraqi civilians in 
Haditha last November and, more recently, in Hamdaniyah, seem set to follow 
the usual course. If anyone is found guilty, it will be privates and 
sergeants. The press will reassure us that the problem was just a few "bad 
apples," that higher-ups had no knowledge of what was going on, and that 
"99.9%" of our troops in Iraq are doing a splendid job of upholding, indeed 
enforcing, human rights. It's called the "Abu Ghraib precedent."

The fact that senior Marine and Army leaders don't seem to know what is 
going on in cases like this is a sad comment on them. Far from being 
exceptional incidents caused by a few bad soldiers or Marines, mistreatment 
of civilians by the forces of an occupying power are a central element of 
Fourth Generation war. They are one of the main reasons why occupiers tend 
to lose. Haditha, Hamdaniyah and the uncountable number of incidents where 
U.S. troops abused Iraqi civilians less severely than by killing them are a 
direct product of war waged by the strong against the weak.

There are, of course, lesser causes as well, and it is on the lesser causes 
that we tend to focus. Poor leadership in a unit easily opens the door to 
misconduct. Overstretched, overtired units snap more easily. Every military 
service in history has included a certain percentage of criminals, and a 
larger percentage of bullies. The fact that in both Iraq and Afghanistan, 
the insurgencies are getting stronger, not weaker, generates increasing 
frustration among our troops: nothing they do seems to yield any real 
progress. The enemy's highly effective use of IEDs leads units that have 
been hit often and hard to take their frustrations out on the civilian 
populations, since they cannot find, identify or shoot back at the people 
who are hitting them.

But all of these factors are secondary to the power of weakness itself. We 
may find it easier to grasp what the power of weakness is and how it works 
on us by first imagining its opposite. Imagine that instead of facing 
rag-tag bands of poorly equipped and trained insurgents, our Marines and 
soldiers in Iraq were in a very difficult fight with an opponent similar to 
themselves, but somewhat stronger.

What would fighting the strong do for them? Being David rather than Goliath, 
they would see themselves as noble. Every victory would be a cause for 
genuine pride. Defeats would not mean disgrace, but instead would demand 
greater effort and higher performance. Even after a failure, they could 
still look at themselves in the mirror with pride. Knowing they faced a 
stronger enemy, their own cohesion would grow and their demand for 
self-discipline would increase.

If the enemy's overmatch were too great, it could lead our units to 
hopelessness and disintegration. But a fight with an enemy who is stronger 
but still beatable would buck us up more than tear us down on the 
all-important moral level.

Now, to see the situation as it is, turn that telescope around. Every 
firefight we win in Iraq or Afghanistan does little for our pride, because 
we are so much stronger than the people we are defeating. Every time we get 
hit successfully by a weaker enemy, we feel like chumps, and cannot look 
ourselves in the mirror (again, with IED attacks this happens quite often). 
Whenever we use our superior strength against Iraqi civilians, which is to 
say every time we drive down an Iraqi street, we diminish ourselves in our 
own eyes. Eventually, we come to look at ourselves with contempt and see 
ourselves as monsters. One way to justify being a monster is to behave like 
one, which makes the problem worse still. The resulting downward spiral, 
which every army in this kind of war has gotten caught in, leads to 
indiscipline, demoralization, and disintegration of larger units as fire 
teams and squads simply go feral.

Again, this process is fundamental to Fourth Generation war. Martin van 
Crevald has stressed the power of weakness as one key, if not the key, to 
4GW, and he is correct. It shows just how far America's military leadership 
is from grasping Fourth Generation war that its response in Iraq has been to 
order all troops to undergo a two to four-hour "refresher course in core 
values."

The investigations of Marines for possible murders of Iraqi civilians in 
Haditha last November and, more recently, in Hamdaniyah, seem set to follow 
the usual course. If anyone is found guilty, it will be privates and 
sergeants. The press will reassure us that the problem was just a few "bad 
apples," that higher-ups had no knowledge of what was going on, and that 
"99.9%" of our troops in Iraq are doing a splendid job of upholding, indeed 
enforcing, human rights. It's called the "Abu Ghraib precedent."

The fact that senior Marine and Army leaders don't seem to know what is 
going on in cases like this is a sad comment on them. Far from being 
exceptional incidents caused by a few bad soldiers or Marines, mistreatment 
of civilians by the forces of an occupying power are a central element of 
Fourth Generation war. They are one of the main reasons why occupiers tend 
to lose. Haditha, Hamdaniyah and the uncountable number of incidents where 
U.S. troops abused Iraqi civilians less severely than by killing them are a 
direct product of war waged by the strong against the weak.

There are, of course, lesser causes as well, and it is on the lesser causes 
that we tend to focus. Poor leadership in a unit easily opens the door to 
misconduct. Overstretched, overtired units snap more easily. Every military 
service in history has included a certain percentage of criminals, and a 
larger percentage of bullies. The fact that in both Iraq and Afghanistan, 
the insurgencies are getting stronger, not weaker, generates increasing 
frustration among our troops: nothing they do seems to yield any real 
progress. The enemy's highly effective use of IEDs leads units that have 
been hit often and hard to take their frustrations out on the civilian 
populations, since they cannot find, identify or shoot back at the people 
who are hitting them.

But all of these factors are secondary to the power of weakness itself. We 
may find it easier to grasp what the power of weakness is and how it works 
on us by first imagining its opposite. Imagine that instead of facing 
rag-tag bands of poorly equipped and trained insurgents, our Marines and 
soldiers in Iraq were in a very difficult fight with an opponent similar to 
themselves, but somewhat stronger.

What would fighting the strong do for them? Being David rather than Goliath, 
they would see themselves as noble. Every victory would be a cause for 
genuine pride. Defeats would not mean disgrace, but instead would demand 
greater effort and higher performance. Even after a failure, they could 
still look at themselves in the mirror with pride. Knowing they faced a 
stronger enemy, their own cohesion would grow and their demand for 
self-discipline would increase.

If the enemy's overmatch were too great, it could lead our units to 
hopelessness and disintegration. But a fight with an enemy who is stronger 
but still beatable would buck us up more than tear us down on the 
all-important moral level.

Now, to see the situation as it is, turn that telescope around. Every 
firefight we win in Iraq or Afghanistan does little for our pride, because 
we are so much stronger than the people we are defeating. Every time we get 
hit successfully by a weaker enemy, we feel like chumps, and cannot look 
ourselves in the mirror (again, with IED attacks this happens quite often). 
Whenever we use our superior strength against Iraqi civilians, which is to 
say every time we drive down an Iraqi street, we diminish ourselves in our 
own eyes. Eventually, we come to look at ourselves with contempt and see 
ourselves as monsters. One way to justify being a monster is to behave like 
one, which makes the problem worse still. The resulting downward spiral, 
which every army in this kind of war has gotten caught in, leads to 
indiscipline, demoralization, and disintegration of larger units as fire 
teams and squads simply go feral.

Again, this process is fundamental to Fourth Generation war. Martin van 
Crevald has stressed the power of weakness as one key, if not the key, to 
4GW, and he is correct. It shows just how far America's military leadership 
is from grasping Fourth Generation war that its response in Iraq has been to 
order all troops to undergo a two to four-hour "refresher course in core 
values."

They are caught in a hurricane, and all they can do is spit in the wind. The 
rest of us should get ready for the house to blow down.

June 8, 2006

William Lind [send him mail] is Director of the Center for Cultural 
Conservatism at the Free Congress Foundation. The views expressed in this 
article are those of Mr. Lind, writing in his personal capacity.

They are caught in a hurricane, and all they can do is spit in the wind. The 
rest of us should get ready for the house to blow down.

June 8, 2006

William Lind [send him mail] is Director of the Center for Cultural 
Conservatism at the Free Congress Foundation. The views expressed in this 
article are those of Mr. Lind, writing in his personal capacity.